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The purpose of this paper is to describe a set of temporal alethic–deontic systems, i.e.
systems that include temporal, alethic and deontic operators. All in all we will consider
2,147,483,648 systems. All systems are described both semantically and proof theoretically.
We use a kind of possible world semantics, inspired by the so-called T ×W semantics, to
characterize our systems semantically and semantic tableaux to characterize them proof
theoretically. We also show that all systems are sound and complete with respect to their
semantics.
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1. Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to describe a set of temporal alethic–deontic systems, i.e. systems that include temporal,
alethic and deontic operators. All systems are described both semantically and proof theoretically. We use a kind of possible
world semantics, inspired by the so-called T × W semantics (see Section 3), to characterize our systems semantically and
semantic tableaux (see Section 4) to characterize them proof theoretically. We also show that all systems are sound and
complete with respect to their semantics.
Several philosophers and logicians have developed logical systems that deal with various combinations of conditions
governing temporal, alethic and deontic elements (e.g. Chellas [15], Bailhache [5–8], van Eck [21], Thomason [38,39], Åqvist
and Hoepelman [4], Åqvist [3], Bartha [9], Horty [28], Belnap, Perloff and Xu [10], Brown [11–13]). These are important
contributions to deontic logic, since temporal, modal and deontic concepts seem to interact in a number of different inter-
esting ways. There are many similarities but also some differences between these approaches and the current work. Various
thinkers introduce different languages, different proof methods and different semantics. Most temporal alethic–deontic lo-
gicians use some kind of tree-like structure to describe their systems semantically, for instance the so-called Ockhamist
frames perhaps ﬁrst hinted at in Prior [35], and they try to ﬁnd different axioms that correspond to different conditions
that may be imposed on these structures.
In a number of essays Zanardo and co-workers have developed systems that combine modal and temporal logic (e.g.
Zanardo [42], DiMaio and Zanardo [20], Ciuni and Zanardo [18]). Even though the systems described in these essays do not
include a deontic part, the work is relevant for anyone interested in developing a temporal alethic–deontic logic. (See also
von Kutschera [31], Åqvist [2] and Wölﬂ [41].)
If we may simplify matters, it seems to us that there are basically three kinds of semantics that have been used by tem-
poral alethic–deontic logicians, T×W semantics (e.g. [3–8,15,40]), moment based (branching time) semantics (e.g. [9,10,28])
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to both together. On the moment based (branching time) approach a set of concrete moments and a causal relation that
orders the moments into a tree-like structure are basic. The past at any moment is usually taken to be ﬁxed, while the
future is open. A maximal set of linearly ordered moments is a history. Sentences are evaluated at moment/history pairs.
According to the branch based semantics, branches are basic. We can say that two branches are related to each other when
they have the same past and a moment can be viewed as an equivalence class under this alternative relation. Sentences are
then evaluated at branches.
However, the differences between these types of semantics are not great and it is not clear how to classify various
thinkers. Both Chellas [15] and Åqvist and Hoepelman [4], for instance, suggest that possible worlds might be interpreted
as functions from a set of moments of time into a set of events or concrete situations. A possible world can then be seen as
a possible course of events, a possible history or a temporally ordered sequence of events. So, their approaches are similar
to the moment based (branching time) semantics. And e.g. Zanardo’s work (see references above) shows that there are
important connections between branch based semantics and T × W semantics. We use a kind of T × W semantics in this
essay.
However, from a proof theoretical viewpoint, all of these earlier approaches to temporal alethic–deontic logic are ax-
iomatic. As far as we know, no one has developed any semantic tableau systems that include temporal, alethic and deontic
components. We are only aware of tableau systems for mono- and multi-modal systems that evaluate sentences at a single
point (world, time) (see Section 4 for some relevant references). In all systems discussed in this essay truth is relativized
to both possible worlds and moments in time. This requires a whole new set a tableau rules and new soundness and
completeness proofs.
Why should we study these systems? We will brieﬂy mention some considerations that seem to us to make this inves-
tigation both philosophically and logically interesting.
(i) Our temporal alethic–deontic systems are more expressive than various mono-modal systems that only include one
kind of modal operator. We can therefore symbolize many sentences and arguments formulated in natural languages that
cannot be symbolized in a mono-modal system.
Consider, for instance, the ought-implies-can principle (only what is possible is obligatory) and the means-end principle
(every necessary consequence of what ought to be ought to be), which include both alethic and deontic concepts. It seems
impossible to symbolize such principles using only one kind of modality, but we can formalize some versions of them in
our systems (see Section 5).
We will now consider an argument that includes temporal, alethic and deontic concepts that seems clearly valid given
some natural readings. Let us call this argument the You ought to love your children argument. We will mention two inter-
pretations of this argument. According to the ﬁrst, the concept of necessity in the second premise should be analyzed as
universal or absolute necessity and according to the second, it should be analyzed as historical necessity (see Section 2.2).
In Example 7 we will prove that the conclusion in the You ought to love your children argument is indeed derivable from
the premises in the weakest tableau system T described in this essay (see Section 4.3), if the concept of necessity in the
second premise is interpreted as absolute necessity. Since this system is sound with respect to the class of all models (see
Sections 3 and 6), the argument is valid on this class given the ﬁrst interpretation. This will illustrate how to use our sys-
tems to establish that an argument is valid. We will also show that the conclusion in the argument isn’t derivable from
the premises in T given that the concept of necessity is interpreted as historical necessity (see Example 8). Since T is com-
plete with respect to the class of all models (see Section 6), it follows that the argument isn’t valid on this class given the
second interpretation. This will illustrate how we can use the tableau method to produce countermodels and show that an
argument is invalid. We hope that this example will be enough to convince the reader that our systems have interesting
philosophical applications and are therefore worth considering.
The You ought to love your children argument
It is always going to be the case that you ought to love your children.
It is necessary that if you love your children, then you respect your children and care for your children.
Hence, it is always going to be the case that you ought to respect your children and it is always going to be the case
that you ought to care for your children.
We don’t know whether the premises in this argument are (settled) true or not but we think that they are intuitively
plausible and the argument seems clearly valid given certain natural interpretations of the second premise. Furthermore,
we seem to need a temporal alethic–deontic logic to show this. In [24] Erich Fromm suggests that it is a conceptual or
essential truth that (true) love includes respect and caring (among other things). If this is correct, it seems reasonable to
claim that it is (absolutely) necessary that you (truly) love someone only if you respect this person and care for this person.
Furthermore, it appears to be a reasonable norm that (it is settled that) it is always going to be the case that you ought to
love your children (at least for most parents as long as they live). So, both premises seem plausible, or at least interesting.
This and countless other arguments suggest that we need temporal alethic–deontic logic.
Of course, as one of the anonymous referees pointed out, the fact that multi-modal logics are more expressive than
mono-modal systems comes with a price in terms of computational complexity. For some purposes, it may be desirable to
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But if we are interested in using our logics to analyze sentences and arguments formulated in natural languages that include
temporal, alethic and deontic concepts we believe that we need very rich systems.
(ii) It might be possible to use some of our systems to solve at least some deontic paradoxes, e.g. Priors’ para-
doxes of derived obligation (see Prior [34]) and Chisholms’ contrary-to-duty paradox (see Chisholm [17]) that are
problematic for pure monadic deontic systems (see e.g. Bailhache [6], which suggests that a system similar to our
aTB4dD45adMOOC45t4FCBCadtSPSRPIFTBT can be used to solve these paradoxes). However, to be able to symbolize
contrary-to-duty obligations we probably need to add some kind of dyadic deontic operator to our systems (in [7] Bail-
hache seems to come to this conclusion too). Hopefully, we will be able to show how dyadic deontic logic can be combined
with the systems in this essay in later work.
(iii) We can use our systems to analyze or elucidate some interesting concepts that have been discussed by moral
philosophers and deontic logicians for some time, e.g. the concept of a prima facie obligation. (See van Eck [21] (especially
Chapters II and IV) for an idea about how to do this.)
(iv) In some of our systems we can prove that the so-called wide and narrow conditional obligation sentences are
equivalent under certain conditions (see Section 5, Theorem 4 and Table 23). These equivalences can be used to shed some
light on the so-called dilemma of commitment and detachment (see van Eck [21] especially Chapters II and IV).
(v) Many people think that a main function of norms and deontic sentences is to guide human behaviour and that only
future actions can be guided. This idea can be given an interesting interpretation in our systems (see Section 5).
(vi) Semantic tableau systems are often more user-friendly than corresponding axiomatic systems. It is often easier to
prove sentences, to check whether a set of sentences is consistent, to decide the validity of an argument, etc. in a semantic
tableau system. Furthermore, it is often relatively easy to prove things about various systems of this kind. This is a good
reason not to focus exclusively on Hilbert-style temporal alethic–deontic logics as deontic logicians have tended to do up
until now.
(vii) Some temporal alethic–deontic systems discussed in the literature have only been proved sound with respect to
their semantics, e.g. the system DARB constructed by Åqvist and Hoepelman (see [4]). (DARB is probably incomplete, as
pointed out by Bailhache [7].) We prove that all our systems are both sound and complete. Furthermore, we show that all
our systems are sound and complete in a uniform way, using the same method for all systems.
(viii) Choices between different temporal, alethic and deontic systems can to a large extent be made independently, and
we can combine our semantic conditions and tableau rules in many different ways. All such combinations lead to a total
of 2,147,483,648 systems. Many of these are deductively equivalent, but many are also non-equivalent. We think that it is
a good thing that we have many systems to choose from. Some of our logics are perhaps not philosophically relevant or
interesting, but it seems likely that at least some, perhaps many, of them are. Different systems may perhaps be used for
different purposes and to symbolize different alethic, temporal and deontic concepts.
As an anonymous referee correctly pointed out, one cannot derive the fact that (it seems likely that) at least some of
the logics are philosophically relevant or interesting from their sheer number. But of course we are not claiming that. The
reasons why this seems likely to us are much more complicated. It seems likely because most of our semantic conditions
and tableau rules seem plausible in themselves and because our temporal alethic–deontic tableau systems include many
mono-modal temporal, alethic and deontic systems that appear interesting and that are well-known in the literature and
that many philosophers and logicians have considered plausible. It seems likely because our systems are consistent and
contain theorems that seem intuitively attractive to us. It seems likely because the systems cohere well with our belief
sets. It seems likely because even though many of the systems seem interesting, some of them include theorems that
are controversial and that some philosophers may want to deny. E.g. the ought-implies-can principle appears reasonable
if “ought” is interpreted as a moral notion or “ought all-things considered”, but perhaps there are interpretations of the
concept on which this principle is not plausible, for instance if “ought” is interpreted as “prima facie ought” or “ought
according to the law”. So, for some applications we may want to include the rules (T-OC) or (T-OC′) speciﬁed below in our
tableau system and for other applications we may want to exclude them. And so on.
(ix) By imposing different semantic conditions and adding appropriate tableau rules in an obvious way, our systems can
be made to include many of the standard, normal alethic, deontic and temporal systems that can be found in the literature
(e.g. M , B , S4, S5, etc.). (See e.g. [1,14,16,25,27,36] and the introduction to [32] for more on some basic alethic, deontic and
temporal systems.)
(x) We consider some semantic conditions and theorems that have not been discussed before in connection with tem-
poral alethic–deontic logic (e.g. C-WPI, C-OC′ , C-MO′ , C-ab5, C-PMP, C-OMP, C-MOP, etc.), at least not explicitly and as far as
we are aware. Yet they seem philosophically and/or theoretically interesting.
The essay is divided into 6 sections. In Section 2 we describe the syntax of our systems and in Section 3 their semantics.
Section 4 deals with the proof theoretic characterization of our logics and Section 5 includes some examples of theorems.
Finally, Section 6 contains soundness and completeness proofs for every system.
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2.1. Alphabet
(i) A denumerably inﬁnite set Prop of proposition letters p, q, r, s, p1, q1, r1, s1, p2, q2, r2, s2, . . . , (ii) a denumerably
inﬁnite set NT of names of times t0, t1, t2, t3, . . . , (iii) the primitive truth-functional connectives ¬ (negation), ∧ (conjunc-
tion), ∨ (disjunction), → (material implication) and ↔ (material equivalence), (iv) the alethic operators U , M ,  and ♦,
(v) the temporal operators R , G , H , F and P , (vi) the deontic operators O and P , and (vii) the brackets (, ).
2.2. Language
The language L is the set of well-formed formulas (wffs) generated by the usual clauses for proposition letters and
propositionally compound sentences, and the following clauses: (i) if A is a wff, then U A (“it is universally (or absolutely)
necessary that A”), MA (“it is universally (or absolutely) possible that A”), A (“it is historically necessary (or settled)
that A”), ♦A (“it is historically possible that A”), GA (“it is always going to be the case that A”), HA (“it has always been
the case that A”), F A (“it will some time in the future be the case that A”), P A (“it was some time in the past the case
that A”), O A (“it ought to be the case that A”) and P A (“it is permitted that A”) are wffs, (ii) if A is a wff and t is in NT,
then Rt A (“it is realized at time t that A”) is a wff, and (iii) nothing else is a wff.
Capital letters A, B , C , . . . are used to represent arbitrary (not necessarily atomic) formulas of the object language. The
upper case Greek letter Γ represents an arbitrary set of formulas. Brackets around sentences are usually dropped if the
result is not ambiguous.
2.3. Deﬁnitions
♦−A (“it is impossible that A”) = ¬♦A, F A (“it is forbidden that A”) = ¬P A, A (“it is historically contingent that A”) =
♦A ∧ ♦¬A, A (“it is historically non-contingent that A”) = ¬A (or A ∨ ¬A), AA (“it is always true that A”) = HA ∧
A∧GA, S A (“sometimes it is true that A”)= ¬A¬A (or P A∨ A∨ F A), [G]A = A∧GA, 〈F 〉A = ¬[G]¬A (or A∨ F A), [H]A =
A ∧ HA, 〈P 〉A = ¬[H]¬A (or A ∨ P A), A ⇒ B =(A → B), A ⇔ B =(A ↔ B).
3. Semantics
3.1. Basic concepts
3.1.1. Temporal alethic–deontic frame
A temporal alethic–deontic frame F is a relational structure 〈W , T ,<, R, S〉, where W is a non-empty set of possible
worlds, T is a non-empty set of times, < is a binary relation on T (<⊆ T × T ) and R and S are two ternary accessibility
relations (R ⊆ W × W × T and S ⊆ W × W × T ).
R “corresponds” to the alethic operators  and ♦, < to the temporal operators G , F , H and P and S to the deontic
operators O and P . Informally, τ < τ ′ says that the time τ is before the time τ ′ (or that τ ′ is later than τ ) Rωω′τ says that
the possible world ω′ is alethically accessible from the possible world ω at time τ , and Sωω′τ says that ω′ is deontically
accessible from ω at τ .
3.1.2. Temporal alethic–deontic model
A temporal alethic–deontic model M is a triple 〈F , V , v〉 where: (i) F is a temporal alethic–deontic frame; (ii) V is a
valuation or interpretation function, which to every proposition letter p in Prop assigns a subset of W × T , i.e. a set of
ordered pairs 〈ω,τ 〉, where ω ∈ W and τ ∈ T ; and (iii) v is a function which to each temporal name in NT assigns a time
in T .
When M = 〈F , V , v〉 we say that M is based on the frame F , or that F is the frame underlying M . To save space, we
shall also use the following notation for a temporal alethic–deontic model: 〈W , T ,<, R, S, V , v〉, where W , T , <, R , S , V
and v are interpreted as usual. “F” stands for a class of frames and “M” for a class of models.
3.1.3. Truth in a model
Let M be any temporal alethic–deontic model 〈F , V , v〉, based on a temporal alethic–deontic frame F = 〈W , T ,<, R, S〉.
Let ω ∈ W , τ ∈ T and let A be a well-formed sentence in L. M,ω, τ  A abbreviates A is true at or in the possible world
ω at the time τ in the temporal alethic–deontic model M (or A is true at the pair 〈ω,τ 〉 in M). The truth conditions for
proposition letters and complex sentences are given in the following list. Those for truth-functional connectives are the
usual ones (illustrated by conjunction):
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(ii) M,ω, τ  A ∧ B iff M,ω, τ  A and M,ω, τ  B ,
(iii) M,ω, τ A iff ∀ω′ ∈ W s.t. Rωω′τ : M,ω′, τ  A,
(iv) M,ω, τ ♦A iff ∃ω′ ∈ W s.t. Rωω′τ : M,ω′, τ  A,
(v) M,ω, τ  GA iff ∀τ ′ ∈ T s.t. τ < τ ′: M,ω, τ ′  A,
(vi) M,ω, τ  F A iff ∃τ ′ ∈ T s.t. τ < τ ′: M,ω, τ ′  A,
(vii) M,ω, τ  HA iff ∀τ ′ ∈ T s.t. τ ′ < τ : M,ω, τ ′  A,
(viii) M,ω, τ  P A iff ∃τ ′ ∈ T s.t. τ ′ < τ : M,ω, τ ′  A,
(ix) M,ω, τ  Rt′A iff M,ω, v(t′) A, for all t′ ∈ NT ,
(x) M,ω, τ  O A iff ∀ω′ ∈ W s.t. Sωω′τ : M,ω′, τ  A,
(xi) M,ω, τ  P A iff ∃ω′ ∈ W s.t. Sωω′τ : M,ω′, τ  A,
(xii) M,ω, τ  U A iff ∀ω′ ∈ W and ∀τ ′ ∈ T : M,ω′, τ ′  A,
(xiii) M,ω, τ  MA iff ∃ω′ ∈ W and ∃τ ′ ∈ T : M,ω′, τ ′  A.
3.1.4. Validity, satisﬁability, logical consequence, etc.
Now we are in a position to deﬁne several important semantic concepts.
Validity in a class of models. A sentence A is valid on or in a class of models M (M A) iff A is true at every pair 〈ω,τ 〉
in every model in M.
Satisﬁability in a class of models. A set of sentences Γ is satisﬁable in a class of models M iff every sentence in Γ is
true at some pair 〈ω,τ 〉 in some model in M.
Logical consequence in a class of models. A sentence B is a logical consequence of a set of sentences Γ on or in a class
of models M (M,Γ  B) iff B is true at every pair 〈ω,τ 〉 in every model in M at which all members of Γ are true.
The concepts of validity, satisﬁability and logical consequence in a class of frames are deﬁned similarly.
3.2. Conditions on frames and models
We will explore several different conditions on our frames and models in this section. The conditions are divided into
six classes. The ﬁrst class tells us something about the formal properties of the relation <, the second about the formal
properties of the relation R (at a time), the third about the formal properties of the relation S (at a time), the fourth about
how R and S are related to each other (at a time), the ﬁfth about how R and S are related to <, and the sixth consists of
two conditions that we may impose on the valuation function V in a model.
The variables x, y, z, w in Tables 1–6 are taken to range over possible worlds in W , t , t′ , t′′ over times in T , and the
symbols ∧, →, ∀ and ∃ are used as metalogical symbols in the standard way. Let F = 〈W , T ,<, R, S〉 be a temporal alethic–
deontic frame and M = 〈W , T ,<, R, S, V , v〉 be a temporal alethic–deontic model. If ∀t∀x∃ySxyt , we say that S satisﬁes
or fulﬁlls condition C-dD and also that F and M satisfy or fulﬁll condition C-dD and similarly in all other cases. C-dD is
called “C-dD” because the tableau rule T -dD “corresponds” to C-dD and the sentence dD is valid on the class of all frames
and in the class of all models that satisfy condition C-dD and similarly in all other cases. Let C be any of the conditions in
Tables 1–6. Then a C-frame is a frame that satisﬁes condition C and a C-model is a model that satisﬁes C .
Most of these conditions are self-explanatory. Nevertheless, we will add a few comments.
The conditions on < are well-known from temporal logic (see e.g. [36] and [14]). Intuitively, C-P D (as in Past D) says
that there is no ﬁrst point in time and C-F D (as in Future D) that there is no last point in time. C-t4 (as in temporal 4)
claims that time is transitive and C-DE (as in DEnse) that time is dense. C-PC (as in Past Convergence) says that time
doesn’t branch towards the past and C-F C (as in Future Convergence) that time doesn’t branch towards the future.
The conditions on R and S are similar to well-known conditions on the alethic and deontic accessibility relations in
mono-modal alethic and deontic logic, respectively (see e.g. [1,16]). The only difference is that R and S are 3-place relations
in our systems. Intuitively, this corresponds to the idea that the ordinary 2-place relations R and S are relativized to
particular moments in time. So, intuitively C-aT says that R is reﬂexive at every time and C-dD says that S is serial at
every time etc.
The conditions concerning the relation between R and S correspond to interesting bi-modal principles. The sentence MO
(as in the Must-Ought principle) is valid on the class of frames that satisﬁes C-MO . The sentence OC (as in the Ought-Can
principle) is valid on the class of frames that satisﬁes C-OC etc. “PMP ” stands for “Permitted-Must Permutation”, “OMP ”
stands for “Ought-Must Permutation” and “MO P ” stands for “Must-Ought Permutation”. (In two (currently) unpublished
essays Bimodal Logic and Bimodal Logic and Semantic Tableaux we investigate these principles more closely. For some general
ideas about how to combine two or more modal systems, see e.g. Kracht [30] and Gabbay, Kurucz, Wolter and Zakharyaschev
[26].)
Intuitively, C-S P (as in Shared Past) says that if a world y is alethically accessible from a world x at a certain time t′
then y is also alethically accessible from x at all earlier times t . C-SR (as in Secondary Ramiﬁcation) says that if a time t
is before a time t′ and the world y is deontically accessible from the world x at t and the world z is deontically accessible
from y at t′ , then z is also deontically accessible from y at t . According to C-P I (as in Post-Implication) the world z is
deontically accessible from the world y at time t′ if y is deontically accessible from the world x at time t , z is alethically
accessible from y at t′ and t is before t′ . C-W P I (as in Weak Post-Implication) is interpreted similarly. A brief discussion of
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t and world y is alethically accessible from x at t , then p is true in y at t . C-BT (as in Backward Transfer) is interpreted
similarly. Note that p in these conditions is atomic. Together C-F T and C-BT say that if world y is alethically accessible
from world x at time t , then p is true in x at t iff p is true in y at t , for every atomic sentence p. C-S P , C-SR and C-P I
are mentioned by Bailhache in several works, e.g. in [6–8]. C-W P I is a weaker condition than C-P I that we ﬁnd intuitively
more plausible.
3.2.1. Conditions on the relation <
Table 1
Condition Formalization of condition
C-P D ∀t∃t′t′ < t
C-F D ∀t∃t′t < t′
C-t4 ∀t∀t′∀t′′((t < t′ ∧ t′ < t′′) → t < t′′)
C-DE ∀t∀t′(t < t′ → ∃t′′(t < t′′ ∧ t′′ < t′))
C-F C ∀t∀t′∀t′′((t < t′ ∧ t < t′′) → (t′ < t′′ ∨ t′ = t′′ ∨ t′′ < t′))
C-PC ∀t∀t′∀t′′((t′ < t ∧ t′′ < t) → (t′ < t′′ ∨ t′ = t′′ ∨ t′′ < t′))
3.2.2. Conditions on the relation R
Table 2
Condition Formalization of condition
C-aT ∀t∀xRxxt
C-aD ∀t∀x∃yRxyt
C-aB ∀t∀x∀y(Rxyt → Ryxt)
C-a4 ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Rxyt ∧ Ryzt) → Rxzt)
C-a5 ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Rxyt ∧ Rxzt) → Ryzt)
3.2.3. Conditions on the relation S
Table 3
Condition Formalization of condition
C-dD ∀t∀x∃ySxyt
C-d4 ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Sxyt ∧ Syzt) → Sxzt)
C-d5 ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Sxyt ∧ Sxzt) → Syzt)
C-dT ′ ∀t∀x∀y(Sxyt → Syyt)
C-dB ′ ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Sxyt ∧ Syzt) → Szyt)
3.2.4. Conditions concerning the relation between R and S
Table 4
Condition Formalization of condition
C-MO ∀t∀x∀y(Sxyt → Rxyt)
C-OC ∀t∀x∃y(Sxyt ∧ Rxyt)
C-OC ′ ∀t∀x∀y(Sxyt → ∃z(Ryzt ∧ Syzt))
C-MO ′ ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Sxyt ∧ Syzt) → Ryzt)
C-ad4 ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Rxyt ∧ Syzt) → Sxzt)
C-ad5 ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Rxyt ∧ Sxzt) → Syzt)
C-PMP ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Sxyt ∧ Rxzt) → ∃w(Rywt ∧ Szwt))
C-OMP ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Rxyt ∧ Syzt) → ∃w(Sxwt ∧ Rwzt))
C-MO P ∀t∀x∀y∀z((Sxyt ∧ Ryzt) → ∃w(Rxwt ∧ Swzt))
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Table 5
Condition Formalization of condition
C-S P ∀t∀t′∀x∀y((t < t′ ∧ Rxyt′) → Rxyt)
C-SR ∀t∀t′∀x∀y∀z((t < t′ ∧ Sxyt ∧ Syzt′) → Syzt)
C-W P I ∀t∀t′∀x∀y((t < t′ ∧ Sxyt ∧ Rxyt′) → Sxyt′)
C-P I ∀t∀t′∀x∀y∀z((t < t′ ∧ Sxyt ∧ Ryzt′) → Syzt′)
3.2.6. Conditions on the valuation function V in a model
Table 6
Condition Formalization of condition
C-F T If Rxyt and 〈x, t〉 ∈ V (p), then 〈y, t〉 ∈ V (p) for all p in Prop, t in T and x and y in W
C-BT If Rxyt and 〈y, t〉 ∈ V (p), then 〈x, t〉 ∈ V (p) for all p in Prop, t in T and x and y in W
3.3. Classiﬁcation of model classes
The 31 conditions on our models listed in Tables 1–6 can be used to obtain a categorization of the set of all models
into various kinds. All in all there are 2,147,483,648 different combinations of these conditions. In general, we shall say that
M(C1, . . . ,Cn) is the class of (all) models that satisﬁes the conditions C1, . . . ,Cn . E.g. M(C–dD,C–aT ,C–MO ) is the class of
all models that satisﬁes C-dD , C-aT and C-MO .
3.4. The logic of a class of models
The set of all sentences (in L) that are valid in a class of models M is called the logical system of (the system of or the
logic of) M, in symbols S(M) = {A ∈ L: M  A}. E.g. S(M(C–dD,C–aT ,C–MO )) is the set of all sentences that are valid in
the class of all models that satisﬁes C-dD , C-aT and C-MO .
By using the classiﬁcation of model classes mentioned in Section 3.3 we obtain 2,147,483,648 different systems deﬁned
in this way. In the next section we will develop a set of semantic tableau systems that exactly correspond to these logics.
4. Proof theory
4.1. Semantic tableaux
The kind of semantic tableau systems we use is inspired by Melvin Fitting and Graham Priest (see e.g. Fitting [22], Fitting
and Mendelsohn [23] and Priest [33]). The propositional part is similar to systems introduced by Raymond Smullyan [37]
and Richard Jeffrey [29].
The concepts of semantic tableau, branch, open and closed branch, etc. are essentially deﬁned as in Priest [33]. However,
there are some minor differences. A node in a tree now has one of the following forms: ti < t j (time τ [i] is before time
τ [ j]), rwiw jtk (world ω j is alethically accessible from world ωi at time τ [k]), swiw jtk (world ω j is deontically accessible
from world ωi at time τ [k]), ti = t j (the time τ [i] is the same as the time τ [ j]), or A,wit j (A is true in world ωi at time
τ [ j]) where A is a wff in L. A tableau branch is closed iff it contains anything of the form A,wit j and ¬A,wit j. (τ [i] is the
time picked out by ti, ω j the world picked out by wj, etc.) For more on semantic tableaux, see D’Agostino, Gabbay, Hähnle
and Posegga [19].
4.2. Tableau rules
4.2.1. Propositional rules
We use the same propositional rules as in Priest [33] modiﬁed in an obvious way. We call them (∧), (¬∧), etc.
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Table 7
U M  ♦
U A,wit j
↓
A,wktl
for any wk and tl
MA,wit j
↓
A,wktl
where wk and tl are new
A,witk
rwiw jtk
↓
A,wjtk
♦A,witk
↓
rwiw jtk
A,wjtk
where wj is new
¬U ¬M ¬ ¬♦
¬U A,wit j
↓
M¬A,wit j
¬MA,wit j
↓
U¬A,wit j
¬A,wit j
↓
♦¬A,wit j
¬♦A,wit j
↓¬A,wit j
4.2.3. Basic deontic rules (bd-rules)
The basic d-rules look exactly like the basic a-rules for , ♦, ¬, ¬♦, except that  is replaced by O , ♦ by P , and r
by s. We give them similar names.
4.2.4. Basic temporal rules (bt-rules), Id(I) and Id(II)
Table 8
G H F P
G A,wit j
t j < tk
↓
A,witk
H A,wit j
tk < t j
↓
A,witk
F A,wit j
↓
t j < tk
A,witk
where tk is new
P A,wit j
↓
tk < t j
A,witk
where tk is new
¬G ¬H ¬F ¬P
¬GA,wit j
↓
F¬A,wit j
¬HA,wit j
↓
P¬A,wit j
¬F A,wit j
↓
G¬A,wit j
¬P A,wit j
↓
H¬A,wit j
Table 9
Rt ¬Rt Id(I) Id(II)
Rti A,wjtk
↓
A,wjti
¬Rti A,wjtk
↓
Rti¬A,wjtk
A(ti)
ti = t j
↓
A(t j)
A(ti)
t j = ti
↓
A(t j)
4.2.5. Alethic accessibility rules (a-rules)
Table 10
T -aD T -aT T -aB T -a4 T -a5
witk
↓
rwiw jtk
where wj is new
wit j
↓
rwiwit j
rwiw jtk
↓
rw jwitk
rwiw jtl
rw jwktl
↓
rwiwktl
rwiw jtl
rwiwktl
↓
rw jwktl
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Table 11
T -t4 T -P D T -F D
ti < t j
t j < tk
↓
ti < tk
t j
↓
tk < t j
where tk is new
t j
↓
t j < tk
where tk is new
T -DE T -F C T -PC
ti < t j
↓
ti < tk
tk < t j
where tk is new
ti < t j
ti < tk
↙↓↘
t j < tk t j = tk tk < t j
t j < ti
tk < ti
↙↓↘
t j < tk t j = tk tk < t j
4.2.7. Deontic accessibility rules (d-rules)
Table 12
T -dD T -d4 T -d5 T -dT ′ T -dB ′
witk
↓
swiw jtk
where wj is new
swiw jtl
sw jwktl
↓
swiwktl
swiw jtl
swiwktl
↓
sw jwktl
swiw jtl
↓
sw jw jtl
swiw jtl
sw jwktl
↓
swkwjtl
4.2.8. Alethic-deontic accessibility rules (ad-rules)
Table 13
T -MO T -MO ′ T -OC T -OC ′
swiw jtk
↓
rwiw jtk
swiw jtl
sw jwktl
↓
rw jwktl
witk
↓
swiw jtk
rwiw jtk
where wj is new
swiw jtl
↓
rw jwktl
sw jwktl
where wk is new
T -ad4 T -ad5 T -PMP T -OMP T -MO P
rwiw jtl
sw jwktl
↓
swiwktl
rwiw jtl
swiwktl
↓
sw jwktl
swiw jtm
rwiwktm
↓
rw jwltm
swkwltm
where wl is new
rwiw jtm
swjwktm
↓
swiwltm
rwlwktm
where wl is new
swiw jtm
rw jwktm
↓
rwiwltm
swlwktm
where wl is new
4.2.9. Rules concerning R, S, < and V (adt-rules)
Table 14
T -F T T -BT T -S P
A,witk
rwiw jtk
↓
A,wjtk
where A is atomic
A,wjtk
rwiw jtk
↓
A,witk
where A is atomic
rwiw jtl
tk < tl
↓
rwiw jtk
T -SR T -P I T -W P I
swiw jtl
tl < tm
sw jwktm
↓
sw jwktl
swiw jtl
tl < tm
rw jwktm
↓
sw jwktm
swiw jtk
tk < tl
rwiw jtl
↓
swiw jtl
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is tk < ti, A(t j) is tk < t j. If A(ti) is ti = tk, A(t j) is t j = tk. If A(ti) is rwkwlti, A(t j) is rwkwlt j. If A(ti) is swkwlti, A(t j)
is swkwlt j. There are inﬁnitely many Rt and ¬Rt rules, a pair for every t in NT.
4.3. Tableau systems
A tableau system is a set of tableau rules. A temporal alethic–deontic tableau system includes all propositional rules,
all basic alethic rules, all basic deontic rules and all basic temporal rules (Sections 4.2.1–4.2.4, Tables 7–9). The minimal
temporal alethic–deontic tableau system is called “T ”. Id(I) and Id(II) are added to every system that includes T -F C or
T -PC (they are redundant in every other system). By adding any subset of the rules introduced in Sections 4.2.5–4.2.9 (Ta-
bles 10–14), we obtain an extension of T . Many of the 2,147,483,648 different systems obtained in this way are deductively
equivalent, i.e. contain exactly the same set of theorems. We use the following conventions for naming systems. We write
“aA1 . . . AidB1 . . . B jadC1 . . .CktD1 . . . DladtE1 . . . Em”, where A1 . . . Ai is a list (possibly empty) of a-rules, B1 . . . B j is a list
(possibly empty) of d-rules, C1 . . . Ck is a list (possibly empty) of ad-rules, D1 . . . Dl is a list (possibly empty) of t-rules, and
E1 . . . Em is a list (possibly empty) of adt-rules. We sometimes abbreviate by omitting “redundant” letters in a name, if it
doesn’t lead to any ambiguity. E.g. aTdDadOCt4adtS P is the temporal alethic–deontic system that includes the rules T -aT ,
T -dD , T -OC , T -t4 and T -S P .
4.4. Proof, derivation, theorem, consistency in a system, etc.
The concepts of proof, theorem, derivation, consistency, inconsistency in a system etc. can essentially be deﬁned in the
usual way. Nevertheless, we will mention a few examples to show how to modify these deﬁnitions in the current setting.
Let S be a tableau system and let an S-tableau be a tableau generated in accordance with the rules in S .
Proof in a system. A proof of A in S is a closed S-tableau for ¬A,w0t0, i.e. a closed S-tableau whose root consists of
¬A,w0t0.
Theorem in a system. A is a theorem in S or provable in S or syntactically valid in S ( S A) iff there is a proof of A
in S , i.e. iff there is a closed S-tableau for ¬A,w0t0.
Derivation in a system. A derivation or argument in the system S of B from the (ﬁnite) set of formulas Γ , is a closed S-
tableau whose initial list comprises A,w0t0 for every A ∈ Γ and ¬B,w0t0. The sentences A in Γ are called the premises
of the derivation or argument and B is called the conclusion of the derivation or argument. The initial list of a tableau
consists of the ﬁrst nodes in this tableau whose satisﬁability we are testing.
Proof-theoretic consequence in a system. B is a proof-theoretic consequence of the set of formulas Γ in S or B is
derivable from a set of formulas Γ in S (Γ  S B) iff there is a derivation of B in S from Γ , i.e. iff there is a closed S-
tableau whose initial list comprises A,w0t0 for every A ∈ Γ and ¬B,w0t0. If an argument or inference consists of the
premises Γ and the conclusion B , we shall say that this argument is (proof-theoretically) valid in a system S iff (Γ  S B),
i.e. iff B is derivable from Γ in S .
Consistency and inconsistency. Γ is consistent in a system S iff it is not possible to derive a contradiction from Γ in S .
Γ is inconsistent in a system S iff it is not the case that Γ is consistent in S , i.e. iff it is possible to derive a contradiction
from Γ in S .
In the deﬁnition of a derivation we have assumed that the set Γ of premises in a tableau derivation of B from Γ is ﬁnite.
The tableau technique can be extended to deal with (denumerably) inﬁnite sets of premises by straightforwardly adapting a
method mentioned by Smullyan [37], p. 64, but we will not labour the details here.
4.5. The logic of a tableau system
Let S be a tableau system. Then the logic (or the (logical) system) of S , L(S), is the set of all sentences (in L) that are
provable in S , in symbols L(S) = {A ∈ L: S A}. E.g. L(aTdDt4) is the set of all sentences that are provable in the system
aTdDt4, i.e. in the system that includes the basic rules and the (non-basic) rules T -aT , T -dD and T -t4.
5. Examples of theorems
Theorem 1. The sentences in Tables 15–27 are theorems (or more precisely theorem schemas) in the indicated systems.
Proof. Straightforward. 
The pure temporal, alethic and deontic conditions on models and theorems discussed above are well-known in the
literature, and require no further comment here. Let S be a tableau system. By adding different a-rules (Table 10) to T in
obvious ways S can be made to include any of the 32 standard normal alethic systems (including e.g. M , B , S4 and S5)
for historical necessity and by adding different d-rules (Table 12) to T in obvious ways S can be made to include any of
the 32 standard normal deontic systems (e.g. O K , SDL (standard deontic logic) and O S5+) well-known in the literature
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Name Theorem System
aK (A → B) → (A →B) T
aT A → A aT
aD A → ♦A aD
aB A →♦A aB
a4 A →A a4
a5 ♦A →♦A a5
Table 16
Name Theorem System
dK O (A → B) → (O A → O B) T
dD O A → P A dD
d4 O A → O O A d4
d5 P A → O P A d5
dT ′ O (O A → A) dT ′
dB ′ O (P O A → A) dB ′
Table 17
Name Theorem System
t F K G(A → B) → (GA → GB) T
t P K H(A → B) → (H A → HB) T
A → GP A T
A → HF A T
t4 GA → GGA t4
t4′ HA → HHA t4
F D GA → F A t F D
P D H A → P A t P D
DE F A → F F A tDE
DE ′ P A → P P A tDE
FC (F A ∧ F B) → (F (A ∧ F B) ∨ F (A ∧ B) ∨ F (F A ∧ B)) t F C
PC (P A ∧ P B) → (P (A ∧ P B) ∨ P (A ∧ B) ∨ P (P A ∧ B)) t PC
Table 18
Name Theorem System
MO A → O A adMO
OC O A → ♦A adOC
OC ′ O (O A → ♦A) adOC ′
MO ′ O (A → O A) adMO ′
ad4 O A →O A ad4
ad5 P A →P A ad5
PMP PA →P A adPMP
OMP OA →O A adOMP
MO P O A → OA adMO P
Table 19
Theorems in T .
¬Rt A ↔ Rt¬A Rt(A ∨ B) ↔ (Rt A ∨ RtB)
Rt A ↔ ¬Rt¬A Rt(A → B) ↔ (Rt A → RtB)
Rt(A ∧ B) ↔ (Rt A ∧ RtB) Rt(A ↔ B) ↔ (Rt A ↔ RtB)
(see e.g. Chellas [16] and Åqvist [1]). Likewise, S can be made to include many standard temporal systems by adding t-rules
(Table 11) to T in obvious ways.
Let the concepts of an S5-operator, M-operator, etc. be understood in the usual way. Then U and M are S5-operators
in every system. In T [G], 〈F 〉, [H] and 〈P 〉 are M-operators and A and S are B-operators. In t4 [G], 〈F 〉, [H] and 〈P 〉 are
S4-operators and A and S are B-operators. In t4PC [G], 〈F 〉, [H] and 〈P 〉 are S4-operators. In t4PC FC and t4PC FCDE [G],
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Name Theorem System
Rt′Rt A ↔ Rt A T
RtA ↔ RtRt A T
RtO A ↔ RtO Rt A T
Rt♦A ↔ Rt♦Rt A T
Rt P A ↔ Rt P Rt A T
FG(A ∧ ¬A) →F G(A ∧ ¬A) T
GF (A ∨ ¬A) →GF (A ∨ ¬A) T
(GA → F A) →(GA → F A) T
(H A → P A) →(H A → P A) T
P H(A ∧ ¬A) →P H(A ∧ ¬A) T
H P (A ∨ ¬A) →HP (A ∨ ¬A) T
Rt A → RtRt A, where A is atomic adt F T
S P Rt′Rt A → RtRt A, if v(t′) < v(t) adtS P
SR Rt′O (Rt′O Rt A → RtO Rt A), if v(t′) < v(t) adtSR
P I Rt′O Rt(O A →A), if v(t′) < v(t) adt P I
Table 21
Theorems in adtS P .
HA →H A ♦P A → P♦A
PA →P A ♦H A → H♦A
GA → GA F♦A → ♦F A
P♦−A → ♦−H A G¬A → G♦−A
H♦−A →H¬A G(A → B) → G(A →B)
H♦−A → ♦−P A G(A ↔ B) → G(A ↔B)
H(A → B) →(H A → HB) (GA ∧ GB) → G(A ∧B)
H(A ⇒ B) → (H A ⇒ HB) F (♦A ∨ ♦B) → ♦(F A ∨ F B)
H(A ↔ B) →(H A ↔ HB) (G¬A ∧ G¬B) → G(♦−A ∧ ♦−B)
H(A ⇔ B) → (H A ⇔ HB) (GA ∨GB) → G(A ∨B)
H(A ∧B) →(H A ∧ HB) F (♦A ∧ ♦B) → (♦F A ∧ ♦F B)
♦(P A ∨ P B) → P (♦A ∨ ♦B) (G¬A ∨G¬B) → G(♦−A ∨ ♦−B)
H(♦−A ∧ ♦−B) →(H¬A ∧ H¬B) P (A ∧B) →(P A ∧ P B)
(HA ∨ HB) →(H A ∨ HB) ♦(H A ∧ HB) → H(♦A ∧ ♦B)
♦(P A ∧ P B) → (P♦A ∧ P♦B) ♦(H A ∨ HB) → H(♦A ∨ ♦B)
(H♦−A ∨ H♦−B) →(H¬A ∨ H¬B) P (A ∨B) →(P A ∨ P B)
Table 22
Theorems in aTdDadMO .
(A ∨¬A) → (O A ↔ A)  A → (O A ↔ A)
(A ∨¬A) → (P A ↔ A)  A → (P A ↔ A)
(A ∨¬A) → (A ↔ A)  A → (A ↔ A)
(A ∨¬A) → (♦A ↔ A)  A → (♦A ↔ A)
〈F 〉, [H] and 〈P 〉 are S4.3-operators and A and S are S5-operators. Obviously, [G]A → GA, [H]A → HA, F A → 〈F 〉A and
P A → 〈P 〉A are theorem schemas in every system.
Theorem 2.
(i) AA → GH A and AA → [G][H]A are theorem schemas in t PC .
(ii) AA → HGA and AA → [H][G]A are theorem schemas in t F C .
(iii) Let [∗] =, O , A, Rt, [G],G, [H] or H, and 〈∗〉 = ♦, P , S, Rt, 〈F 〉, F , 〈P 〉 or P . Then U A → [∗]A and 〈∗〉A → MA are theorem
schemas in T .
(iv) U A →AA, U A → AA, ♦S A → MA and S♦A → MA are theorem schemas in T .
Proof. Straightforward. 
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Theorems in aTdDadMO .
A → (O (A ∧ B) ↔ (A ∧ O B))
A → (O (B ∧ A) ↔ (O B ∧ A))
A → (O (A ∨ B) ↔ (A ∨ O B))
A → (O (B ∨ A) ↔ (O B ∨ A))
A → (O (A → B) ↔ (A → O B))
A → (O (B → A) ↔ (P B → A))
A → (O (A ↔ B) ↔ ((A → O B) ∧ (P B → A)))
A → (O (B ↔ A) ↔ ((P B → A) ∧ (A → O B)))
The bi-modal, alethic–deontic conditions, rules and theorems mentioned above are discussed more closely in Bimodal
Logic and Bimodal Logic and Semantic Tableaux (see Section 3.2). In these essays several sentences that become provable
if we add some of the ad-rules are listed, and we shall only add a few comments about them here. (Kracht [30] and
Gabbay, Kurucz, Wolter and Zakharyaschev [26] contain some more general ideas about how to combine two or more
modal systems.) O A → ♦A and O (O A → ♦A) are two versions of Kant’s ought-implies-can principle that are provable in
some of our systems. The sentence (O A ∧(A → B)) → O B is a theorem in any system including T -MO . This sentence is
a version of the so-called means-end principle. O A →O A says that all obligations are historically necessary, P A →P A
that all permissions are historically necessary and F A → F A that all prohibitions are historically necessary. O A → O A
and F A →F A are theorem schemas in all systems that include T -ad4 and P A →P A is a theorem schema in all systems
that include T -ad5. So, if we add T -ad4 and T -ad5 to T all norms become historically necessary. However, O A → U O A,
P A → U P A and F A → U F A are not theorems. Our norms are therefore not absolute.
With these brief remarks out of the way, let us concentrate on the conditions, rules and theorems that are characteristic
of our systems in this essay.
We shall say that A is non-future iff A doesn’t contain any operator of the form G , F , or Rt (at least if v(t) is a time
later than the time of the valuation of the sentence).
Theorem 3.
(i) p →p, ¬p →¬p, p ∨¬p, p and (pCq) →(pCq), where C = ∧,∨,→ or ↔, are theorems in adt F T BT .
(ii) U A →U A and MA →MA hold in T .
(iii) Hp →Hp and P p →P p are theorems in adtS P F T .
Assume that v(t′) < v(t) in (iv)–(x). Then
(iv) Rt′p → RtRt′p, Rt′¬p → RtRt′¬p and Rt′(pCq) → RtRt′(pCq), where C = ∧,∨,→ or ↔, are theorems in
adt F T BT S P .
(v) Rt′Hp → RtRt′Hp and Rt′P p → RtRt′P p are theorems in t4adtS P F T .
(vi) Rt′A → RtRt′A is a theorem schema in a4adtS P .
(vii) Rt′♦A → RtRt′♦A is provable in a5adtS P .
(viii) Rt′O A → RtRt′O A hold in ad4adtS P .
(ix) Rt′P A → RtRt′P A is a theorem schema in ad5adtS P .
(x) Rt′U A → RtRt′U A and Rt′MA → RtRt′MA are provable in T .
(xi) If A is non-future, then A and A are theorem schemas in the systems aT B4ad45adtS P F T and aT B4ad45adtS P BT .
(xii) If A is non-future, then all of the following sentences are theorems in the systems aT B4dDad45MOadtS P F T and
aT B4dDad45MOadtS P BT : A ↔ A, O A ↔ A, ♦A ↔ A, P A ↔ A.
(xiii) If A is non-future and v(t′) < v(t), then Rt′A → RtRt′A.
Proof. Straightforward. (Note that T -BT is a derived rule in every system that includes T -F T and T -aB and that T -F T is a
derived rule in every system that includes T -BT and T -aB .) 
So, there are systems in which the distinctions between some different modalities collapse under certain circumstances,
i.e. all of the following sentences are equivalent: A, O A, A, P A, ♦A in the systems indicated in Theorem 3, part (xii),
given that A is non-future. This suggests that genuine norms concern the future and that O and P only function as practical
deontic operators when they are preﬁxed to future-tensed sentences.
Theorem 4. If A is non-future, then all of the consequents in Table 23 (i.e. O (A ∧ B) ↔ (A ∧ O B), O (B ∧ A) ↔ (O B ∧ A), etc.) are
theorems in the systems aT B4dDad45MOadtS P F T and aT B4dDad45MOadtS P BT .
Proof. Straightforward. 
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Theorems in aTdDadMO .
A → (P (A ∧ B) ↔ (A ∧ P B))
A → (P (B ∧ A) ↔ (P B ∧ A))
A → (P (A ∨ B) ↔ (A ∨ P B))
A → (P (B ∨ A) ↔ (P B ∨ A))
A → (P (B → A) ↔ (O B → A))
A → (P (A → B) ↔ (A → P B))
A → (P (A ↔ B) ↔ ((A → P B) ∧ (O B → A)))
A → (P (B ↔ A) ↔ ((O B → A) ∧ (A → P B)))
Table 25
Theorems in t P D .
UGA → GU A FMA → MF A
HU A → UHA MP A → PMA
PU A → U P A MHA → HMA
Table 26
Theorems in t F D .
GU A → UGA MF A → FMA
UHA → HU A PMA → MP A
FU A → U F A MGA → GMA
Table 27
Theorems in some systems.
Theorem System Theorem System
UA →U A aT ♦MA → M♦A aT
U A → UA aD and aT M♦A → ♦MA aD and aT
♦U A → U♦A aD and aT MA →MA aD and aT
Some philosophers think that a conditional obligation should be formalized as a “wide conditional obligation” of the
form O (A → B) and others think that it should be formalized as a “narrow conditional obligation” of the form A → O B .
(Of course, many philosophers reject both of these views and argue for some alternative. However, the classical alternatives
are captured by these symbolizations.) As we can see, these formalizations are equivalent in some systems under certain
conditions. O (A → B) is equivalent to A → O B , when A is historically non-contingent, in the system aTdDadMO , and in
the systems mentioned in Theorem 4 these sentences are equivalent when A is non-future. Factual detachment is not a
valid inference pattern for wide conditional obligations, i.e. we cannot always derive O B from A and O (A → B). However,
in the system aTdDadMO we can detach O B from A and O (A → B) when A is historically settled or non-contingent, and
in the systems aT B4dDad45MOadtS P F T and aT B4dDad45MOadtS P BT we can detach O B from the same sentences when
A is non-future. (These facts may shed some light on the so-called dilemma of commitment and detachment, see van Eck
[21], Chapters II and IV.)
Theorem 5. If A is non-future, then all of the consequents in Table 24 (i.e. P (A ∧ B) ↔ (A ∧ P B), P (B ∧ A) ↔ (P B ∧ A), etc.) are
theorems in the systems aT B4dDad45MOadtS P F T and aT B4dDad45MOadtS P BT .
Proof. Straightforward. 
Bailhache has suggested that we should impose condition C-P I on a reasonable temporal alethic–deontic logic. If we
assume this condition, Rt′O Rt(O A →A), if v(t′) < v(t) is valid (see e.g. Bailhache [5] or [6]). This sentence can be proved
in all our systems that include T -P I . The reason that Bailhache wants to impose this condition is that he thinks that a
deontically accessible world cannot lead in the future to a world that is not deontically accessible. Nevertheless, intuitively
P I may seem to be too strong. We have suggested a slightly weaker condition C-W P I that seems to be a reasonable
condition given certain interpretations, for instance if deontic accessibility is deﬁned in the following way and we want
the preference relation between possible worlds to be the same at every time: ∀t∀x∀y(Sxyt ↔ (Rxyt ∧ ¬∃z(Rxzt ∧ P zy))),
where t ranges over times in T , x and y over possible worlds in W , S and R are interpreted as usual, and P is some kind
of strong binary preference relation between possible worlds in W . (We have not been able to ﬁnd any sentence that would
deﬁne this condition in an axiomatic formulation of our systems.) C-W P I follows from C-P I , but not vice versa. Someone
who thinks that C-P I is too strong may nevertheless want our models to satisfy C-W P I and add T -W P I to our tableau
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(For more information on the Rt operator, see Rescher and Urquhart [36].)
Thomason [40] mentions two sentences that he takes to be reasonable (and that are valid on some classes of models
that he discusses): OG(F p → ¬OG¬p) and OGp → OGOp. These sentences can be proved in some of our systems.
Theorem 6.
(i) OGA → OGO A is a theorem (schema) in the system d4adtSR.
(ii) OG(F A → ¬OG¬A) and OG(F A → P F A) are theorem (schemas) in the systems aTadt P I and aTdT ′adtW P I.
Proof. Straightforward. 
This suﬃces to illustrate some of the characterizing features of our temporal alethic–deontic logics.
Example 7. Let us return to the argument mentioned in the introduction, the You ought to love your children argument. We
will now show that this is valid in the class of all models if the concept of necessity is interpreted as absolute necessity.
Let l stand for “You love your children”, r for “You respect your children” and c for “You care for your children”. Then the
argument is symbolized in the following way: GOl, U (l → (r∧c)) ∴ GOr∧GOc. The T -tableau for this is closed (see below).
Hence, the conclusion is derivable from the premises in T . It follows that this argument is valid in the class of all models.
For T is sound with respect to this class.
(1) GOl,w0t0
(2) U (l → (r ∧ c)),w0t0
(3) ¬(GOr ∧ GOc),w0t0
↙ ↘
(4) ¬GOr,w0t0 [3, ¬∧] (5) ¬GOc,w0t0 [3, ¬∧]
(6) F¬Or,w0t0 [4, ¬G] (7) F¬Oc,w0t0 [5, ¬G]
(8) t0 < t1 [6, F ] (9) t0 < t1 [7, F ]
(10) ¬Or,w0t1 [6, F ] (11) ¬Oc,w0t1 [7, F ]
(12) P¬r,w0t1 [10, ¬O ] (13) P¬c,w0t1 [11, ¬O ]
(14) sw0w1t1 [12, P ] (15) sw0w1t1 [13, P ]
(16) ¬r,w1t1 [12, P ] (17) ¬c,w1t1 [13, P ]
(18) Ol,w0t1 [1, 8, G] (19) Ol,w0t1 [1, 9, G]
(20) l,w1t1 [18, 14, O ] (21) l,w1t1 [19, 15, O ]
(22) l → (r ∧ c),w1t1 [2, U ] (23) l → (r ∧ c),w1t1 [2, U ]
↙ ↘ ↙ ↘
(24) ¬l,w1t1 (25) r ∧ c,w1t1 [22, →] (26) ¬l,w1t1 (27) r ∧ c,w1t1 [23, →]
(28) ∗ [20, 24] (29) r,w1t1 [25, ∧] (30) ∗ [21, 26] (31) r,w1t1 [27, ∧]
(32) c,w1t1 [25, ∧] (33) c,w1t1 [27, ∧]
(34) ∗ [16, 29] (35) ∗ [17, 33]
Example 8. Suppose that we interpret the concept of necessity in the second premise in the You ought to love your children
argument as historical necessity. Then it is symbolized in the following way: GOl, (l → (r ∧ c)) ∴ GOr ∧ GOc, where the
atomic sentences are interpreted as in Example 7. This argument is invalid in the class of all models. We will now show this.
The T-tableau for this argument (see below) is open and complete, i.e. it is not possible to apply any more T-rules. Hence,
the conclusion is not derivable from the premises in the tableau system T . Since T is complete with respect to the class of
all models, it follows that the argument is invalid in the class of all models. We can read off the following countermodel
from the (leftmost) open branch: W = {ω0,ω1}, T = {τ0, τ1}, τ0 < τ1, R is empty, Sω0ω1τ1, l is true in ω1 at τ1, and r is
false in ω1 at τ1. It is easy to see that the premises are true (in ω0 at τ0) and the conclusion false (in ω0 at τ0) in this
model.
(1) GOl,w0t0
(2) (l → (r ∧ c)),w0t0
(3) ¬(GOr ∧ GOc),w0t0
↙ ↘
(4) ¬GOr,w0t0 [3, ¬∧] (5) ¬GOc,w0t0 [3, ¬∧]
(6) F¬Or,w0t0 [4, ¬G] (7) F¬Oc,w0t0 [5, ¬G]
(8) t0 < t1 [6, F ] (9) t0 < t1 [7, F ]
(10) ¬Or,w0t1 [6, F ] (11) ¬Oc,w0t1 [7, F ]
(12) P¬r,w0t1 [10, ¬O ] (13) P¬c,w0t1 [11, ¬O ]
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(16) ¬r,w1t1 [12, P ] (17) ¬c,w1t1 [13, P ]
(18) Ol,w0t1 [1, 8, G] (19) Ol,w0t1 [1, 9, G]
(20) l,w1t1 [18, 14, O ] (21) l,w1t1 [19, 15, O ]
6. Soundness and completeness theorems
We are now in a position to prove that all the systems in this essay are sound and complete with respect to their
semantics. To the best of our knowledge these proofs are completely new, even though the basic idea behind the proofs is
the same as the idea behind similar soundness and completeness proofs for propositional logic and modal logic where a
sentence is evaluated at one parameter (world, moment in time, point) (see e.g. [29,33,37]).
Let S = aA1 . . . AidB1 . . . B jadC1 . . .CktD1 . . . DladtE1 . . . Em be a temporal alethic–deontic tableau system as deﬁned
above. Then we shall say that the class of models, M, corresponds to S just in case M=M(C− A1, . . . ,C− Ai,C− B1, . . . ,C−
B j,C − C1, . . . ,C − Ck,C − D1, . . . ,C − Dl,C − E1, . . . ,C − Em).
S is strongly sound with respect to M iff Γ S A entails M,Γ  A. S is strongly complete with respect to M just in case
M,Γ  A entails Γ S A.
6.1. Soundness theorems
Let M be any temporal alethic–deontic model and b any branch of a tableau. Then b is satisﬁable in M iff there is a
function f from w0,w1,w2, . . . to W and a function g from t0, t1, t2, . . . to T such that (i) A is true in f (wi) at g(t j)
in M , for every node A,wit j on b, (ii) if rwiw jtk is on b, then R f (wi) f (wj)g(tk) in M , (iii) if swiw jtk is on b, then
S f (wi) f (wj)g(tk) in M , (iv) if ti < t j is on b, then g(ti) < g(t j) in M , (v) if ti = t j is on b, then g(ti) = g(t j) in M . If these
conditions are fulﬁlled, we say that f and g show that b is satisﬁable in M .
Lemma 9 (Soundness lemma). Let b be any branch of a tableau and M be any (temporal alethic–deontic)model. If b is satisﬁable in M
and a tableau rule is applied to it, then it produces at least one extension, b′ , of b such that b′ is satisﬁable in M.
Proof. The proof proceeds by going through all the tableau rules. We only sketch some parts to illustrate the method.
(∧) Suppose that A ∧ B,wit j is on b, and that we apply (∧) to give an extended branch, b′ , of b containing A,wit j and
B,wit j. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that A ∧ B is true in f (wi) at g(t j). Hence,
A is true in f (wi) at g(t j) and B is true in f (wi) at g(t j).
(¬∧) Suppose that ¬(A ∧ B),wit j is on b, and that we apply (¬∧) to it. Then two branches arise, one extending b with
¬A,wit j (the left branch); the other extending b with ¬B,wit j (the right branch). Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a
function f and a function g such that ¬(A ∧ B) is true in f (wi) at g(t j). Hence, ¬A is true in f (wi) at g(t j) or ¬B is true
in f (wi) at g(t j). In the ﬁrst case, the left branch is satisﬁable in M . In the second case, the right branch is satisﬁable in M .
() Suppose that A,wit j and rwiw jtk are on b and that we apply () to give an extended branch, b′ , of b containing
A,wjtk. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that A is true in f (wi) at g(t j) in M and
R f (wi) f (wj)g(tk). Hence, A is true in f (wj) at g(tk).
(¬) Assume that ¬A,wit j is on b and that we apply (¬) to obtain an extension of b, b′ , containing ♦¬A,wit j.
Now b is satisﬁable in M . So, there is a function f and a function g such that ¬A is true in f (wi) at g(t j) in M . Hence,
♦¬A is true in f (wi) at g(t j) in M .
(¬P ) Suppose that ¬P A,wit j is on b, and that we apply the rule (¬P ) to extend the branch with O¬A,wit j. Since b is
satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that ¬P A is true in f (wi) at g(t j). Consequently, O¬A is true
in f (wi) at g(t j).
(P ) Assume that P A,witk is on b and that we apply (P ) to obtain an extension, b′ , of b with two new nodes of the
form swiw jtk and A,wjtk on b. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that P A is true
in f (wi) at g(tk). Hence, for some ω ∈ W , S f (wi)ωg(tk) and A is true in ω at g(tk). Let f ′ be the same as f except
that f ′(wj) = ω. Note that f ′ and g also show that b is satisﬁable in M , since f and f ′ differ only at wj. Moreover, by
deﬁnition, S f ′(wi) f ′(wj)g(tk), and A is true in f ′(wj) at g(tk). So, f ′ and g show that b′ is satisﬁable in M .
(T -d4) Suppose that swiw jtl and sw jwktl are on b, and that we apply (T -d4) to give an extended branch b′ of b
containing swiwktl. Now there is a function f and a function g such that S f (wi) f (wj)g(tl) and S f (wj) f (wk)g(tl). For b
is satisﬁable in M . Accordingly, S f (wi) f (wk)g(tl). For M satisﬁes (C-d4).
(T -aB) Suppose that rwiw jtk is on b, and that we apply (T -aB) to give an extended branch b′ of b containing rw jwitk.
Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that R f (wi) f (wj)g(tk). Hence, R f (wj) f (wi)g(tk).
For M satisﬁes (C-aB).
(T -DE) Suppose that ti < t j is on b, and that we apply (T -DE) to get ti < tk and tk < t j, where tk is new to the branch.
Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that g(ti) < g(t j). Hence, for some τ in T , g(ti) < τ
and τ < g(t j). For M satisﬁes condition (C-DE). Let g′ be the same as g except that g′(tk) = τ . Hence, g′(ti) < g′(tk) and
g′(tk) < g′(t j). Since tk does not occur on the branch b, f and g′ show that b′ is satisﬁable in M .
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b with t j < tk, one with t j = tk, and one with tk < t j. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such
that g(ti) < g(t j) and g(ti) < g(tk). By condition (C-F C ), g(t j) < g(tk) or g(tk) < g(t j) or g(t j) = g(tk). So, f and g show
that at least one branch is satisﬁable in M .
(Id(I)) Assume that A(ti) and ti = t j are on b, and that we obtain A(t j) by (Id(I)). Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a
function f and a function g such that g(ti) = g(t j). If A(ti) is A,wkti, A is true in f (wk) at g(ti). So, A is true in f (wk)
at g(t j), which is what we wanted to show. If A(ti) is tk < ti, g(tk) < g(ti). So, g(tk) < g(t j), as required. If A(ti) is ti = tk,
g(ti) = g(tk). Hence, g(t j) = g(tk), which is the result we wanted. If A(ti) is rwkwlti, R f (wk) f (wl)g(ti). Consequently,
R f (wk) f (wl)g(t j), as required.
(T -OC ) Assume that witk is on b, and that we apply (T -OC ) to give an extended branch, b′ , of b containing swiw jtk
and rwiw jtk, where wj is new. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that f (wi) is in
W and g(tk) in T . Hence, for some ω in W , S f (wi)ωg(tk) and R f (wi)ωg(tk), since condition (C-OC ) obtains. Let f ′ be
the same as f except that f ′(wj) = ω. Since wj does not occur on b, f ′ and g show that b is satisﬁable in M . Moreover,
S f ′(wi) f ′(wj)g(tk) and R f ′(wi) f ′(wj)g(tk) by construction. Hence, f ′ and g show that b′ is satisﬁable in M .
(T -F T ) Suppose that A,witk (where A is atomic) and rwiw jtk are on b and that we apply (T -F T ) to b to obtain an
extension b′ containing A,wjtk. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that A is true in
f (wi) at g(tk) and R f (wi) f (wj)g(tk). Hence, A is true in f (wj) at g(tk). For M satisﬁes (C-F T ) and A is atomic.
(T -S P ) Suppose rwiw jtl and tk < tl are on b and that we apply (T -S P ) to obtain an extension b′ of b containing
rwiw jtk. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that R f (wi) f (wj)g(tl) and g(tk) < g(tl).
Hence, R f (wi) f (wj)g(tk). For M satisﬁes (C-S P ).
(T -SR) Suppose swiw jtl, tl < tm and sw jwktm and that we apply (T -SR) to obtain an extension b′ of b containing
sw jwktl. Since b is satisﬁable in M there is a function f and a function g such that S f (wi) f (wj)g(tl), g(tl) < g(tm) and
S f (wj) f (wk)g(tm). Hence, S f (wj) f (wk)g(tl). For M satisﬁes condition (C-SR). 
Theorem 10 (Soundness theorem). Let S be any of the tableau systems discussed in this essay and let M be the class of models that
corresponds to S. Then S is strongly sound with respect to M.
Proof. Once the Soundness lemma is established the proof is an easy modiﬁcation of similar proofs that certain normal
mono-modal systems are sound (see e.g. Priest [33]). 
6.2. Completeness theorems
Let b be an open complete branch of a tableau and let I be the set of numbers on b immediately preceded by a “t”.
We shall say that i  j just in case i = j, or “ti = t j” or “t j = ti” occur on b.  is an equivalence relation and [i] is
the equivalence class of i. The temporal alethic–deontic model, M = 〈W , T ,<, R, S, V , v〉, induced by b is deﬁned as fol-
lows. W = {ωi: wi occurs on b}, T = {τ [i]: i ∈ I}, τ [i] < τ [ j] iff ti < t j occurs on b, Rωiω jτ [k] iff rwiw jtk occurs on
b, Sωiω jτ [k] iff swiw jtk occurs on b. If p,wit j occurs on b, then p is true in ωi at τ [ j] (i.e. then 〈ωi, τ [ j]〉 ∈ V (p)); if
¬p,wit j occurs on b, then p is false in ωi at τ [ j] (i.e. then it is not the case that 〈ωi, τ [ j]〉 ∈ V (p)). If ti occurs on b, then
v(ti) = τ [i]. We shall call this deﬁnition of an induced model “Def. IM”. If our tableau system neither includes T -F C nor
T -PC ,  is reduced to identity and [i] = i. Hence, in such systems, we may take T to be {τ i: ti occurs on b} and dispense
with the equivalence classes.
Lemma 11 (Completeness lemma). Let b be an open branch in a complete tableau and let M be a temporal alethic–deontic model
induced by b. Then:
(i) A is true in ωi at τ [ j], if A,wit j is on b, and
(ii) A is false in ωi at τ [ j], if ¬A,wit j is on b.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the complexity of A.
Basis. If A is atomic, the result is true by deﬁnition.
Induction step. We only go through some of the cases to illustrate the method.
A = ¬B . Suppose that A,wit j occurs on b, i.e. ¬B,wit j is on b. By the induction hypothesis, clause (ii) of the desired
result holds for B , so B is false in ωi at τ [ j], i.e. ¬B is true in ωi at τ [ j]. Hence, if ¬B,wit j is on b, then ¬B is true in ωi at
τ [ j]; which result establishes clause (i) of the lemma. As for clause (ii), suppose that ¬A,wit j occurs on b, i.e. ¬¬B,wit j
is on b. Since the tableau is complete (¬¬) has been applied. Thus B,wit j is on b. Since, by the induction hypothesis,
clause (i) of the desired result holds for B , B is true in ωi at τ [ j], i.e. ¬B is false in ωi at τ [ j]. Hence, if ¬¬B,wit j is on b,
then ¬B is false in ωi at τ [ j], which result settles clause (ii) of the lemma.
A = B ∨ C . Suppose that A,wit j occurs on b, i.e. B ∨ C,wit j is on b. Since the tableau is complete (∨) has been applied.
Thus either B,wit j or C,wit j is on b. By the induction hypothesis, either B is true in ωi at τ [ j] or C is true in ωi at
τ [ j]. Hence, B ∨ C is true in ωi at τ [ j]. Suppose that ¬A,wit j occurs on b, i.e. ¬(B ∨ C),wit j is on b. Since the tableau is
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at τ [ j] and C is false in ωi at τ [ j]. Hence B ∨ C is false in ωi at τ [ j].
A = B . Suppose A occurs on b, i.e. B,witk is on b. Since b is complete () has been applied to B,witk. Thus, for
all wj such that rwiw jtk is on b, B,wjtk is on b. By the induction hypothesis, for all ω j such that Rωiω jτ [k], B is true
in ω j at τ [k]. Hence, B is true in ωi at τ [k]. Suppose that ¬A occurs on b, i.e. ¬B,witk is on b. Then ♦¬B,witk is on
b (by (¬)). For b is complete. Furthermore, since b is complete (♦) has been applied to ♦¬B,witk. Thus, for some wj,
rwiw jtk and ¬B,wjtk are on b. By the induction hypothesis, Rωiω jτ [k] and B is false in ω j at τ [k]. Hence, B is false in
ωi at τ [k].
A = P B . Suppose that A occurs on b, i.e. P B,witk is on b. Since b is complete (P ) has been applied to P B,witk. Thus,
for some wj, swiw jtk and B,wjtk are on b. By the induction hypothesis, Sωiω jτ [k] and B is true in ω j at τ [k]. Hence,
P B is true in ωi at τ [k]. Suppose ¬A occurs on b, i.e. ¬P B,witk is on b. Since b is complete (¬P ) has been applied to
¬P B,witk and O¬B,witk is on b, and since b is complete (O ) has been applied to O¬B,witk. Thus, for all wj such that
swiw jtk is on b, ¬B,wjtk is on b. By the induction hypothesis, for all ω j such that Sωiω jτ [k], B is false in ω j at τ [k].
Hence, P B is false in ωi at τ [k].
A = RtkB . Suppose that A occurs on b, i.e. RtkB,wit j is on b. Then since b is complete (Rt) has been applied to
RtkB,wit j and B,witk is on b. By the induction hypothesis, B is true in ωi at τ [k]. Hence, RtkB is true in ωi at τ [ j].
Suppose that ¬A occurs on b, i.e. that ¬RtkB,wit j is on b. Then since b is complete (¬Rt) has been applied to ¬RtkB,wit j
and Rtk¬B,wit j is on b, and (Rt) has been applied to Rtk¬B,wit j. Thus, ¬B,witk is on b. By the induction hypothesis, B
is false in ωi at τ [k]. Hence, RtkB is false in ωi at τ [ j]. (This argument goes through for every Rt operator.)
A = GB . Suppose that A occurs on b, i.e. GB,wit j is on b. Since b is complete (G) has been applied to GB,wit j. Thus,
for all tk such that t j < tk is on b, B,witk is on b. By the induction hypothesis, for all τ [k] such that τ [ j] < τ [k], B is
true in ωi at τ [k]. Hence, GB is true in ωi at τ [ j]. Suppose that ¬A occurs on b, i.e. that ¬GB,wit j is on b. Since b is
complete (¬G) has been applied to ¬GB,wit j. Hence, F¬B,wit j is on b. Again, since b is complete (F ) has been applied
to F¬B,wit j. So, for some tk, t j < tk and ¬B,witk are on b. By the induction hypothesis, τ [ j] < τ [k] and B is false in ωi
at τ [k]. It follows that GB is false in ωi at τ [ j].
Conclusion. The lemma holds for a sentence A of any complexity. 
Theorem 12 (Completeness theorem). Let S be any of the tableau systems discussed in this essay and letM be the class of models that
corresponds to S. Then S is strongly complete with respect toM.
Proof. The proof is an easy modiﬁcation of similar proofs in mono-modal logic (see e.g. Priest [33]).
For the weakest system T , the proof goes like this. Suppose that not Γ  T B , i.e. it is not the case that there is a closed
T -tableau whose initial list comprises A,w0t0 for every A ∈ Γ and ¬B,w0t0. Let t be a complete T -tableau whose initial
list comprises A,w0t0 for every A ∈ Γ and ¬B,w0t0. Then it is not the case that t is closed, i.e. it is open. Since t is open,
there is at least one open branch in t . Let b be an open branch in t . By the Completeness lemma, the model that b induces
makes all the premises A ∈ Γ true in ω0 at τ [0] and B false in ω0 at τ [0]. Hence, not M, Γ  B . Thus, if not Γ  T B , then
not M, Γ  B . Consequently, if M, Γ  B , then Γ  T B (for ﬁnite Γ ).
In this proof we have assumed that Γ is ﬁnite. But we can also prove that the theorem holds when Γ is inﬁnite by
adapting the method in Smullyan [37] mentioned above in Section 4.4.
For all other systems, we just have to check that the model induced by the open branch, b, is of the right kind in every
case. We only consider some cases to illustrate the method.
(C-aT ) Suppose that ωi ∈ W . Then wi occurs on b [by Def. IM]. Since b is complete (T -aT ) has been applied. Thus,
rwiwitk is on b. Hence, Rωiωiτ [k], as required [by Def. IM].
(C-dT ′) Suppose that Sωiω jτ [k]. Then swiw jtk occurs on b [by Def. IM]. Since the tableau is complete, (T -dT ′) has
been applied and sw jw jtk occurs on b. Hence, Sω jω jτ [k], as required [by Def. IM].
(C-t4) Suppose that τ [i] < τ [ j] and τ [ j] < τ [k]. Then ti < t j and t j < tk occur on b [by Def. IM]. Since b is complete,
(T -t4) has been applied and ti < tk occurs on b. Hence, τ [i] < τ [k], as required [by Def. IM].
(C-OC ) Suppose that ωi ∈ W . Then wi occurs on b [by Def. IM]. Since b is complete (T -OC ) has been applied. Thus, for
some wj, swiw jtk and rwiw jtk are on b. Hence, for some ω j, Sωiω jτ [k] and Rωiω jτ [k], as required [by Def. IM].
(C-MO ) Suppose that Sωiω jτ [k]. Then swiw jtk occurs on b [by Def. IM]. Since b is complete, (T -MO ) has been applied
and rwiw jtk occurs on b. Accordingly, Rωiω jτ [k], as required [by Def. IM].
(C-PMP ) Suppose that Sωiω jτ [m] and Rωiωkτ [m]. Then swiw jtm and rwiwktm occur on b [by Def. IM]. Since b is
complete, (T -PMP ) has been applied and for some wl, rw jwltm and swkwltm occur on b. Consequently, for some ωl,
Rω jωlτ [m] and Sωkωlτ [m], as required [by Def. IM].
(C-PC ) Suppose that τ [ j] < τ [i] and τ [k] < τ [i]. Then t j < ti and tk < ti are on b. Since b is complete, (T -PC ) has been
applied and t j < tk or t j = tk or tk < t j is on b [by Def. IM]. Hence, τ [ j] < τ [k], τ [ j] = τ [k] or τ [k] < τ [ j], as required [by
Def. IM]. For if t j = tk is on b, j k, and if j k, [ j] = [k].
(C-S P ) Suppose that τ [k] < τ [l] and Rωiω jτ [l]. Then tk < tl and rwiw jtl are on b [by Def. IM]. Since b is complete,
(T -S P ) has been applied and rwiw jtk is on b. Hence, Rωiω jτ [k] as required [by Def. IM].
(C-W P I) Suppose τ [k] < τ [l], Sωiω jτ [k] and Rωiω jτ [l]. Then tk < tl, swiw jtk and rwiw jtl are on b [by Def. IM]. Since
b is complete, (T -W P I) has been applied and swiw jtl is on b. Therefore, Sωiω jτ [l], as required [by Def. IM].
D. Rönnedal / Journal of Applied Logic 10 (2012) 219–237 237(C-F T ) Suppose that A is true in ωi at τ [k], where A is atomic, and that Rωiω jτ [k]. Then A,witk and rwiw jtk are on
b [by Def. IM]. Since b is complete, (T -F T ) has been applied and A,wjtk is on b. Hence, A is true in ω j at τ [k], as required
[by Def. IM]. 
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